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Preface
This research paper was prepared as part of a much larger graduate level thesis on the events surrounding the Confederate decision to conduct a campaign into Pennsylvania during the summer of 1863. My own fascination with the subject began as a thirteen year old Boy Scout during my first trip to Vicksburg National Military Park. I will never forget one of the historical markers that informed me of the Confederacy's simultaneous engagement at Gettysburg. The innocence of youth could not quite fathom the intricate depth of that single marker. I was aware that the Confederacy was the outmanned, outgunned, and outindustrialized little brother, so why in the world would they have become involved at Gettysburg when Vicksburg was under siege? The issue was that simple at the age of thirteen. Almost twenty five years later, including thirteen years as a professional soldier and five staff rides through the entire area of Grant's Vicksburg politics. In addition, the increasingly recognized element of how a nation uses information as an instrument of power is applied in retrospect to further understanding of the Confederate decision.
The discussion of the strategic environment of 1863 is based upon several primary and secondary sources, as well as statistical records. It is impossible to determine all of the influencing external and internal factors that may have contributed to the Confederate decision to conduct offensive action into Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863. However,
given the existing conditions as outlined in the research, the paper concludes that the Confederate decision was a rational, understandable attempt to gain a decisive victory on vi Northern soil in order to take advantage of the political climate and bring the war to a successful close by means of a negotiated settlement.
The importance of the paper is that it offers an historical application of the national instruments of power and the surrounding strategic environment in order to better understand how to apply the process for present and future scenarios. In applying a relatively new and formal process of analysis (Warden's five rings coupled with nodal analysis) to events of the past, attempts to apply the same process to events of the future may result in a greater understanding and awareness of the influencing factors that weigh upon the minds of statesmen and soldiers as they seek to make decisions within their given strategic environment.
Introduction
Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understanding. For the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine gold. 
-Carl Von Clausewitz
In any attempt to understand a particular decision, influencing factors must be taken into account. Most current studies on military operations frame such an analysis within the context of the strategic environment. However, no formal definition exists for that term. Consequently, the strategic environment is defined in this study as the set of existing conditions under which the Confederate leadership made decisions in an attempt to attain national objectives. Four national instruments of power are used to frame the discussion: economics, political, military, and information. This chapter will provide insight into each one of these areas in an attempt to assess their collective effect on Confederate leadership and decision making in 1863 as it pertained to the impending problem of what to do about Vicksburg.
Many factors were at work in the strategic environment. The Southern economy was in shambles. Supplies for both Southern soldiers and citizens was lacking. Southern manpower was dwindling. Southerners looked for hope in the expectation that Lincoln would be defeated in the Presidential election of 1864 and be replaced by someone who would negotiate a settlement. The "peace movement" was gaining ground in the North due to outspoken proponents such as Ohio Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham.
Southern leaders, particularly Robert E. Lee, were beginning to think about how to leverage existing or potential strength against Northern weakness. Could the growing "peace movement" be exploited to hinder Lincoln's ability to prosecute the war? That was only one potential question of many as Lee and the Southern War Cabinet discussed strategic options for 1863.
Economics
There have been numerous books and articles written on the economic conditions existing on both sides at the outset of the war. However, most critical to our discussion is the impact that the protracted war had on the respective sides. The Northern economy was primarily based on an industrial system that thrived on war. More industry and more demand for finished products meant more jobs. More jobs generally led to more prosperity and the resulting impact was a boost in the morale of the civilian populace.
Conversely, the Southern economy was primarily based on an agricultural system that was ravaged by the war, especially when the majority of the war was fought on the home farmland of such an agrarian society. In addition, those that normally farmed the land were now fighting a war. The end result was a decrease in the ability to cultivate cotton and food crops such as wheat, an associated loss of income, and continual deterioration of morale in the civilian populace.
It was under such an adverse economic situation that the war continued for the Confederacy in 1863. The South initially thought that cotton would be the tool (the instrument of power) to win the war. In 1860, cotton exports accounted for 57 percent of the total value of all American exports and Southern leaders initially had speculated that withholding shipments to England and France, both of which depended heavily upon cotton for textile manufacturing, might force them to intervene on the South's behalf in order to restore trade. The South also thought the withholding of cotton would cripple the North's foreign trade ability since cotton was obviously the premiere American export.
However, King Cotton diplomacy failed. There was an initial surplus of cotton in England and France in 1861 and by the time they needed additional cotton, the North had effectively implemented the blockade of the South. In addition, the North was able to make up her export revenue by replacing the loss of the South's cotton with increased exports of wheat. England was able to offset her loss of textile revenue from the loss of cotton imports by selling arms to both sides. Furthermore, nations such as China, Egypt, Brazil, and India also began to export cotton to Europe in place of the South. 1 The net result was a dismal economic atmosphere for the South by 1863.
In addition, the results summarized above were basically the external factors that affected the Confederacy-there were also numerous internal factors resulting from government fiscal policies that were, at best, questionable. The Confederate government was unwilling to tax its people and relied on increasingly worthless issues of paper money.
Government agents seized personal property for the use of the military and failed to compensate the citizenry at fair market values. Government leaders made no arrangements for the centralized control of manufacturing output and transportation schedules to support the war effort. Some critics have noted that the Confederacy "died of Democracy" because "the Southern people insisted upon retaining their democratic liberties in wartime" 2 instead of making the necessary self sacrifices.
In terms of the economic instrument of power, the North was not without its problems. "Poverty was widespread and becoming more so among laborers in large cities with a substantial immigrant population. New York packed an immense populace of the poor into noisome tenements, giving the city a death rate nearly twice as high as
London." 3 However, in summarizing the economic situation in 1863, at least two things become apparent. First, an army requires money to raise it, organize it, field it, and then supply it. The Federals were able to do this much more effectively. The Union Armies in 1863, both in the East and the West, were usually well fed, well clothed, and well supplied. "The Confederate Army was poorly clothed and miserably fed." 4 Secondly, the civilian populace in the South was feeling the economic strains of the war in 1863 more greatly than its Northern counterparts. The war was being fought in the South and the citizenry there was paying the price in blood, loss of income, disruption of day-to-day life in many places, and the resulting loss of morale. One particular episode in Richmond bears this out and it is relevant for the insights that it provides into the mix of factors that led to the South's decision to conduct the invasion into Pennsylvania. the Vicksburg problem and he surely was aware of that event , which drove home the painful reality of the Confederacy's increasing inability to feed its people and its armies in the field. What Grant saw in Mississippi was not the case in the heart of Dixie Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia. More importantly, for Robert E. Lee, the heart of Dixie was Virginia and Virginia alone. He was a Virginian first and a Southerner second, and
Virginia was bearing the brunt of the devastation of war.
Political
Numerous works have been devoted to the political ramifications of the war, but two specific items stand out as critical to the strategic environment of 1863 the growing peace movement in the North and Lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. A rather detailed examination would be required to analyze the various political party factions at work during the war. However, for purposes of this discussion, the primary focus will revolve around the two major parties (Democrat and Republican) and the two opposing stances that appeared within each party with respect to Northern politics and ensuing public opinion on the war effort. The Republican Party of President Lincoln was split between Radicals and Conservatives. The Radicals favored the abolishment of slavery suddenly and violently and the consequential restoration of the Union only on that premise. The Conservatives wanted to see an end to slavery, but they were more willing to take a gradual approach and were more concerned with restoration of the Union first.
During the election of 1860, the Democratic Party had split between Northern Democrats and Southern Democrats. The war removed the Southern Democrats from national politics and the remnants of the Democratic Party splintered into war and peace factions.
The significance of those factions in 1863 was that the "Peace Democrats" were beginning to gain momentum in their opposition to Lincoln's prosecution of the war. The other most significant political event of late 1862 and early 1863 was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. This document has a storied history and was the cause of much preliminary debate. Most historians agree that Lincoln's primary concern in prosecuting the war was to restore the Union, but there was constant pressure from abolitionists to take action against slavery. Lincoln had the foresight to know that the issue would involve much more than just the freeing of slaves. The larger social issue of total and equal political and social equality loomed and "he knew that the great mass of white people would not consent." 7 Thus, his seemingly justified hesitance to directly involve the issue of slavery as a basis for the war.
Four major considerations seem to have kept Lincoln from pursuing the slavery issue earlier: (1) there was strong racial prejudice in the North, (2) Confederacy stood for slavery. This is a prime example of how various internal and external factors add to the complexity of strategic policymaking Lincoln's internal political decisions were also subject to the influence and pressure of foreign diplomatic considerations.
Lincoln had decided to issue the proclamation by mid July 1862, but he wanted to do so on the heels of military success so as to avert the appearance of desperation on the Union's part. He had to wait until Lee was turned back at Antietam in late September.
The proclamation was a preliminary one to the formal document that would take effect on January 1, 1863. 9 The issuance of the preliminary document late in September met with predictable results it was controversial to say the least. It did not gain the total support of abolitionists because it did not declare all slaves to be free. It "alienated moderate
Republicans and war Democrats" because they thought the verbiage in effect conceded slavery as the most important war issue as opposed to restoration of the Union. It put more political ammunition into the hands of the opposition (peace) Democrats because it also contained verbiage that could easily be construed as a preliminary basis for a negotiated settlement on the issue of slavery in order to end the war. It also had no immediate effect in England. The English public scorned the contents, as did the abolitionists, on the basis that it only freed the slaves of the Confederate states and did not address the status of those in the loyal slave-holding states. As the London Spectator put it, "The principle is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States."
As with all issues, however, the proclamation was rather Newtonian in nature for each action there is an equal and opposite reaction. While skeptics at home and abroad criticized the proclamation, Lincoln's pronouncement "seized on the popular imagination."
It won important endorsements, including those of the New York Times and a group of
Northern governors. It also found enthusiastic support on the part of the race that was the subject of all the fuss-the African Americans. It was not that there was a massive uprising and exodus into freedom, but the news of the proclamation "encouraged slaves to become restive, to refuse to work, and to steal within Union lines when armies advanced into their sections." Blacks also enlisted in growing numbers after January 1, 1863.
Lincoln wrote to a critic later that year that some of his most important field commanders were reporting that the "emancipation policy, and the use of colored troops, constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion." 10 In the end, the impact of the proclamation would have a devastating effect on the manpower of the Confederacy as opposed to the enormous boost it gave the Union.
There were many factors at work in the strategic environment of 1863 with regard to politics and diplomacy. It can be seen that certainly two of the most critical were the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation and the Southern hope for a continuance of the Northern peace movement. In these two areas another Newtonian aura existed -one was crippling in terms of its impact on the Southern war machine and the other provided a light, flickering unknown in the distance, that victory might still be possible if the right combination of military success and political pressure could merge at some decisive point in the not so distant future.
Military
The military situation in 1863 did not bode well for the Confederacy. Manpower was an increasingly crucial problem. At the start of the year, the decline of available Southern manpower was becoming an obvious factor to deal with in war planning from Richmond, but it was arguably counterbalanced by the psychological impact of the perceived invincibility of General Robert E. Lee. The issue of manpower will be addressed first before turning to Lee.
Manpower strength accounting in the Civil War is one of the more hazardous endeavors in any study, but a general framework is necessary to understand the events of 1863. One source reports the total Union strength on January 1, 1863 as 918,200 of which 547,600, or roughly 60%, were present for duty. The Southern total for the same date was 446,600 of which 272,500, or roughly 61%, were available for duty. 11 The
Union thus outnumbered the South by a 2:1 ratio at the beginning of 1863. But that numerical imbalance did not loom as a strategically decisive factor or a source of great distress for the Confederate government at that juncture. After all, it was nothing new and the South had managed to do rather well in spite of it since the outbreak of the war in 1861. The more pressing question was whether or not the South could continue to replace the heavy losses it was sustaining in major battles. The answer is that it could not.
The South refused to use slaves in any manner until it was virtually too late in 1865.
Consequently, the white male population was the only pool from which to draw recruits and it only numbered approximately 6 million as compared to almost 22,000,000 in the North. 12 The best estimate available is that 900,000 Southerners served a full three-year enlistment during the war as opposed to 1,500,000 men who served an equal term in the Union army. The 900,000 Confederate soldiers represented a larger percentage of the total Southern population than the Union troops did of the Northern population, but the North still had the larger numbers and, more importantly, was able to continue to replace casualties whereas the South was not. The South already had suffered 150,323 total casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) by the end of 1862 as opposed to 146,493 for the Union. 13 The South thus faced an overall 2:1 manpower disadvantage, but was suffering casualties at the same rate (1:1) Lee again writes to Davis telling him that "the tone of the Northern papers" seem to indicate that Grant is preparing to make a move toward Richmond. Lee's own letters show an obvious trend that he heavily depended upon Northern newspapers as a source of information. 22 Lee also could learn from the Northern press that the peace movement seemed to be gathering steam. Indeed, there was a widespread perception, or hope, in the South of 1863 that Lincoln would be defeated in the 1864 election. The most prominent spokesman for the "Peace Democrats," an Ohio Congressman named Clement L.
Vallandigham, had been outspoken in his advocacy of a political solution to the conflict. The primary task of this research paper and the larger original thesis document is to draw some sort of conclusion in trying to understand why the South chose to engage in a major campaign in Pennsylvania when they were faced with impending disaster at Vicksburg. In short, right or wrong aside, can we understand why they chose the Gettysburg option? The answer is yes. In this concluding section, we will examine why this is so. Cabinet anticipated much more from Lee's invasion than a simple frustration of any potential Federal offensive plans or alleviation of supply problems in Virginia. No other conclusion can be drawn but that they were expecting decisive engagement with an associated victory that would provide the means for a negotiated settlement. In the face of diminishing resources and the potential loss of Vicksburg, the leadership of the Confederacy was taking a calculated risk to end the war in Pennsylvania. As Lee had written to Davis on June 10, the desired end state was to get the North to propose peace.
The actual terms could be dealt with later and the South could still pursue her desire for "a distinct and independent national existence under the influence of peaceful measures…" 3 But first, decisive engagement.
The constraints of a brief research paper do not allow for a formal system analysis to aid the argument that the Confederacy was seeking decisive engagement at Gettysburg.
However, the possibility does exist that Warden's five ring analysis, as currently taught at the Air Command and Staff College, can be applied in retrospect to the Confederate decision in an attempt to better understand it. It is an available methodology that can be adapted to offer a potential explanation of the South's actions by using the five ring analysis to determine possible centers of gravity, followed by a nodal analysis to determine the actual targets within each center of gravity.
By utilizing Warden's methodology and ceding the fact that Lee did not have access to such a formal system analysis tool as the five ring approach, a case can be made that Lee would have been thinking along the lines of Lincoln, the Northern public, and the Army of the Potomac as his potential targets, or centers of gravity as they would later become known. 4 The issue then becomes how best to effect or attack the chosen centers of gravity.
The FY97 ACSC curriculum teaches nodal analysis as a means to analyze centers of gravity in order to determine the critical node or most vulnerable element to attack. A simple Civil War example would be an army's logistic system as a potential center of gravity. The nodes, or parts, of that logistic system at a very macro level would include the actual supplies, the storage facilities, the means of transportation, and the logisticians.
An often selected critical node for attack was the rail network, because of its vast impact upon the entire supply system. By following this line of thinking and using the nodal analysis approach, it is an effective tool in gaining an understanding of why the South chose the Gettysburg option. In thinking about three potential centers of gravity Lincoln, the Northern people, and the Army of the Potomac Lee would have been pondering potential critical nodes in an effort to affect those strategic targets. He would have
wanted to affect such items as the press, public opinion, and the morale of the enemy army. There are many potential critical nodes under this scenario. However, the most important node that Lee had to get at was Lincoln's ability to prosecute the war and that ability depended heavily upon the will and support of the people. Lee had to strike fear and panic in both the press and the people to get the desired results. Given the fact that he was strictly opposed to physically terrorizing the civilian populace, he had to undermine their confidence in their army's ability to protect them. He had to psychologically terrorize them. Lee was seeking a decisive engagement. of classic Napoleonic annihilation with ensuing victory. The result would be encouragement of the Northern peace movement, a very unattractive political situation for the Union president seeking reelection, possible foreign intervention on the South's behalf, and hopefully a negotiated settlement to bring the war to a close. Thus Gettysburg. 
Notes
